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 Abstract:	  Building	  on	  previous	  work	  by	  Chiquiar	  (2005)	  we	  study	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  ejido	  communal	  property	  system	  on	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  Mexican	  states.	  The	  average	  growth	  rate	  of	  state	  per	  capita	  GDP	  is	  negatively	  related	  to	  the	  share	  of	  state	  land	  in	  the	  communal	  ejido	  system	  during	  some	  of	  the	  sub-­‐periods	  examined.	  The	  negative	  relation	  suggests	  that	  the	  misallocation	  of	  resources	  related	  to	  the	  limited	  property	  rights	  of	  ejidatarios	  has	  been	  a	  binding	  constraint	  on	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  Mexican	  states	  at	  times	  during	  the	  1970-­‐2012	  period.	  We	  also	  examine	  the	  conditional	  convergence	  or	  divergence	  of	  the	  Mexican	  states	  for	  2003-­‐2012	  and	  2005-­‐2012	  and	  find	  that	  definite	  conclusions	  cannot	  be	  drawn.	  Whether	  state	  GDP	  per	  capita	  converged	  or	  diverged	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  estimations	  start	  with	  2003	  or	  2005	  and,	  interestingly,	  on	  the	  specific	  ejido	  variable	  included	  in	  the	  model.	  
 
Key Words: Economic growth, Mexican states, ejido system, property rights 
 
Acknowledgment: We are very grateful to Daniel Chiquiar for providing his dataset and EViews 
programs. 
	  	  
	  
2	  
I. Introduction 
Real per capita GDP in Mexico grew at an annual average rate of 3.25% from 1940 to 1970, 
1.42% from 1970 to 2001, and 1.47% from 2003 to 2012. (see Table A in the appendix). More 
than two thirds of the thirty-one states also had slower annual growth rates in the 1970-2001 and 
2003-2012 periods. The remaining states along with Mexico City (Distrito Federal) have grown 
more rapidly in recent periods. What explains Mexican economic growth and, in particular, the 
growth slowdown in most states from 1970 to 2012? Numerous authors have attempted to answer 
these questions. 
Esquivel (1999) finds evidence of a slow rate of absolute convergence of per capita gross 
state product in the Mexican states between 1940 and 1995.1 When examining the convergence 
behavior for two subperiods he concludes that almost all movement occurred during 1940-1960 
with very little convergence in 1960-1995. Using annual data on state GDP per capita for 1940-
2001 Carrion-i-Silvestre and German-Soto (2007) find evidence of stochastic convergence in 
most states when structural breaks are taken into account. 
As an initial step, Chiquiar (2005) looks at absolute (β) convergence in per capita state 
income in Mexico for 1970-2001 and finds some supportive evidence. Although his estimation 
over the full sample fails to reveal any indication of β convergence or divergence, conclusions 
change when he separates the sample into two subperiods. Per capita incomes of the states show 
convergence during 1970-1985 and divergence for 1985-2001. Since public infrastructure, 
industrial composition, levels of human capital and other characteristics vary across the states, 
Chiquiar turns his attention to conditional convergence. Using a general to simple procedure to 
eliminate insignificant explanatory variables he formulates empirical models for conditional 
convergence during the two periods. Since the cross-section data set includes only thirty 
observations for each subperiod he estimates the models using seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR). His results indicate conditional convergence of per capita state income for 1970-1985 and 
(conditional) divergence for 1985-2001. Chiquiar explores the reasons for divergence in the latter 
period and concludes that the divergence results are likely due to trade reforms culminating in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.2 Chiquiar concludes that the change in trade policy from 
import substitution to a more open economy appear to have favored the relatively richer northern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Esquivel	  notes	  that	  accounting	  was	  inconsistent	  in	  assigning	  values	  to	  petroleum	  production	  during	  the	  1970-­‐1990	  period	  for	  the	  states	  of	  Campeche	  and	  Tabasco.	  Esquivel	  and	  subsequent	  studies	  reviewed	  herein	  include	  the	  Federal	  District	  (Mexico	  City	  D.F.	  or	  Distrito	  Federal	  in	  Spanish)	  in	  their	  estimations	  although	  it	  is	  not	  a	  state.	  Our	  use	  of	  the	  term	  state	  as	  applied	  to	  Mexico	  should	  be	  understood	  to	  include	  the	  Federal	  District	  of	  Mexico	  City.	  2	  In	  November	  1985	  Mexico	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  pursue	  entry	  into	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  and	  it	  began	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  accord	  less	  than	  a	  year	  later	  in	  1986.	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states that tended to have better infrastructure and more human capital per person. In particular, 
the states sharing a border with the United States seem to have benefited most.  
Our goal is to examine the effects of a specific form of communal property rights, the ejido 
system, on per capita economic growth and convergence in Mexico. We start with the same data 
set as Chiquiar and examine his results when our ejido variable is incorporated into his model. 
We then extend Chiquiar’s data set to examine the effects of the ejido system on Mexico’s recent 
growth experience through 2012. Inclusion of recent data also allows us to revisit the question of 
conditional convergence or divergence among the states.  
Our work is similar to that of Albertus et al. (2013), although our focus is different. Albertus 
et al. primarily wish to know whether the ejido system is used as a political tool to keep the 
dominant party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI, in power, but they also examine 
the effects of land redistribution to ejidos on state income growth 1940-1992.3 They conclude that 
cumulative land distribution, the variable most closely related to our ejido measure, has a 
significant, negative effect on state income growth. Conversely, land distribution within the 
previous five years positively affects economic growth possibly because the redistributed land, 
previously unused for economically productive activities, was quickly put to use for agricultural 
production.  
Our intial finding using the Chiquiar data set augmented with our ejido measures indicates 
that the ejido system had a significant negative effect on gdp growth of the Mexican states during 
1970-1985 but no significant effect on growth in 1985-2001. During the former period ejido 
residents had limited property rights; they could not sell or rent the land and use was restricted to 
agricultural and related activities. Extending the data set alters our initial finding so that the 
effects of the ejido system are insignificant during the 1970-1985 period. The extended results 
now indicate a significantly negative effect of the ejido system on state gdp growth during 1985-
2001 and, in some specifications, 2005-2012. These results provide some support for conjectures 
that the ejido system misallocated resources and limited investment due to the absence of full 
property rights. 
II. Ejido System 
 
Much of the land in Mexico is held as communal property in the ejido system formed during 
the Mexican Revolution. Use of the land is restricted to members of the ejido, termed ejidatarios. 
The ejidatarios are typically descendants of the original ejidatarios or have married into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  According	  to	  Albertus	  et	  al.	  the	  ejido	  system	  is	  a	  ‘punishment	  regime’.	  Ejidatarios	  are	  dependent	  on	  federal	  government	  subsidies	  and	  loans.	  Failure	  to	  support	  the	  PRI	  in	  elections	  could	  lead	  to	  withdrawal	  of	  financial	  support	  and	  substantial	  welfare	  losses	  for	  the	  ejidatarios.	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families of descendants. Prior to legal changes in 1992 numerous restrictions existed on the use 
and management of the property within an ejido. Land in the ejido could only be used for 
agricultural purposes or resource harvesting such as logging and was generally divided into two 
types: parcels and common land. A parcel was assigned to an individual or family for exclusive 
use but could not legally be sold or rented. Use of the common land was shared by all members of 
the ejido. Nor could commonly held land be sold or rented. 
Although the Mexican revolution lasted until 1920, some land was distributed to newly 
formed ejidos before that date. Subsequently land was redistributed to the ejidos on an ongoing 
basis until 1992. According to the national statistics agency, INEGI (n.d.), more than eleven 
million hectares of land were distributed to ejidos in the 1915-1934 period. In the following five 
years the quantity increased to almost nineteen million hectares during the presidency of Lázaro 
Cárdenas. Grants of additional land to ejidos continued until 1992 reaching a peak of almost 
twenty-five million hectares in 1965-1970 during the presidency of Gustavo Díaz. Between 1935 
and 1988 only one president, Miguel Alemán, redistributed less than five million hectares.4 Legal 
changes implemented in 1992 allowed ejidatarios to obtain private titles to their parcels, although 
the process is more time consuming and costly. After these changes common land could be sold 
as a complete unit under certain restrictive conditions.  
The percentage of each state’s area in ejidos varies widely across the states, which allows us 
to test for the growth effects of the ejido system across states (see Table B of the Appendix). 
Summary statistics for these shares are shown in Table 1. The range and the standard deviation of 
the ejido fraction has increased across the analyzed periods.5 For example, in 1981, the parcel 
fraction ranges from 0.003 in Baja California Sur to 0.244 in Veracruz; for 2007, the minimum 
parcel fraction is 0.043 Baja California Sur and the maximum is 0.459 Colima. Data on total land 
area in ejidos are unavailable for 1981, an issue addressed later in the paper. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) propose four categories of rights associated with property that 
assist in understanding land use: Access and withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation. 
Before the 1992 legal changes ejidatarios had rights to enter and obtain products of the property, 
the right of access and withdrawal. The ejidatarios also had management rights since they made 
collective decisions regarding use of common land and, to some extent, the parcels. By law and 
collective decisions only ejidatarios generally had access to ejido property, the right of exclusion. 
However the right to sell or rent the land (or alternatively one’s ‘membership’ in the ejido), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Alemán gave land grants of 4.6 million hectares according to INEGI.   	  
5 Only data for land area in parcels are available for 1981.  
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termed the right of alienation by Schlager and Ostrom, was not permitted. After the land reforms 
of 1992 ejidatarios can obtain this alienation right although the process is difficult.  
III. Theoretical Considerations 
There are at least two reasons why growth or per capita output might be lower under the ejido 
system. First, there may be efficiency losses associated with the misallocation of land or labor. i) 
Land misallocation-The restrictions existing on ejido property may prevent the land from being 
used in the most productive activities. Prior to 1992 ejido land could not be sold or rented. Indeed 
it could not be used for other than agriculture or resource harvesting purposes. The fact that 
nearly 40% of the land area of Mexico City (Distrito Federal in table B of the appendix), the most 
urbanized part of the country, was in the ejido system in 1991 strongly suggests that at least some 
ejido land was not used in the most productive manner, at least prior to the legal changes in 1992. 
After the reforms of 1992, it remains costly and time-consuming for an ejidatario to obtain a 
private title to a parcel or for the members of the ejido to sell the communally owned property.6 
Suggestive of a significant cost associated with obtaining private titles is that slightly more than 
38% of the land area in Mexico City remained in ejidos in 2007, 15 years after reforms allowing 
private ownership and sales. According to Johnson (2001) prior to the legal changes in 1992 
neither parcels nor communal land could be rented nor left idle for more than two years. ii) Labor 
misallocation-Before 1992 an ejidatario who left the ejido to work in a more productive sector ran 
the risk of losing his/her ejido rights including loss of the land. An indication that this effect may 
have been an important constraint on the reallocation of resources comes from Valsecchi 
(forthcoming) who finds evidence that the loosening of such restrictions in the 1992 reform 
significantly increased international immigration of ejidatarios. His results suggest that the ejido 
system restriction was likely a binding constraint on the mobility of ejidatarios within Mexico as 
well.  
Second, the participation of ejidatarios in private credit markets was restricted possibly 
leading to suboptimal investment. Before 1992 ejido land could not be used as collateral for loans 
because financial institutions could not take ownership of properties if ejidatarios defaulted on 
land-collateralized loans. Besley (1996) provides a formal treatment of these effects. 
IV. Data 
The starting point for the study is the data set developed by Chiquiar. See his work for a 
complete description of all data apart from the ejido land data. Note that all estimations in 
Chiquiar and our extensions of his models exclude data for the states of Campeche and Tabasco 
because of inconsistencies in the treatment of petroleum production in these states during 1970-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Johnson	  (2001)	  provides	  a	  thorough	  review	  of	  the	  changes	  brought	  about	  in	  the	  1992	  reform.	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1990 (see footnote 1). Removal of the two states leaves data for thirty states (including the 
Federal District).  
The data on the fraction of each state’s land in the ejido system are drawn from the periodic 
censes undertaken by INEGI. Chiquiar estimates empirical models to explain average annual 
growth of state GDP per capita and test for conditional convergence during 1970-1985 and 1985-
2001. We include data on ejido land area from the 1981 census in the estimated model for the 
former period and from the 1991 census in specification for the latter period. Unfortunately, the 
only ejido data available from the 1981 census are for parcels rather than total land area in the 
ejido and reflect values estimated by INEGI from a sample of 10% of ejidos. The absence of data 
for complete ejidos and the dependence on a sample to estimate the number of hectares in parcels 
is due to the destruction most of the data collected for the 1981 ejido census during the 
earthquake which struck Mexico City in September 1985. To maintain comparability between the 
ejido land area measures in the two subperiods we use the fraction of ejido land in parcels in each 
state during the two subperiods as our measure of extent of the ejido system, even though the 
fraction in parcels is a less comprehensive measure. The	  parcel	  figure	  is	  a	  proxy	  that	  to	  some	  extent	  captures	  the	  extensiveness	  of	  the	  ejido	  system	  in	  each	  state.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  perfect	  measure.	  For	  example	  in	  1991	  only	  0.3%	  of	  the	  land	  in	  Baja	  California	  Sur	  was	  in	  ejido	  parcels	  but	  nearly	  73%	  of	  the	  state’s	  land	  area	  was	  in	  the	  ejido	  system.	  The	  fraction	  of	  total	  ejido	  land	  (parcels	  and	  common	  holdings)	  would	  be	  a	  better	  measure	  but	  these	  data	  were	  among	  those	  lost	  during	  the	  earthquake. 
 
V. Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
As a first step we attempt to replicate Chiquiar’s results for the 1970-1985 and 1985-2001 
subperiods. These estimations yield identical results so any change in the estimated parameters 
occurring after inclusion of the ejido land variable must be due to the introduction of the 
additional explanatory variable. 
The basic estimated model with the ejido land variable is given by equation (1)  
                              !! 𝑦!! − 𝑦!! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑦!! + 𝛽!𝑋!"!!!!! + 𝛾𝐿!! + 𝑒!! 	   (1)	  
where 𝑦!! is the log of per capita GDP in state i for the first year of the period, 𝑦!! is the log of per 
capita GDP in state i for the final year of the period so that the left hand side of equation (1) is the 
average annual log growth rate of per capita GDP in state i over the T periods. 𝐿!! is the fraction of 
total state i land in ejido parcels in census year t, the Xij are the state i explanatory variables in the 
Chiquiar model, and eiT is the residual for state i for the period ending in year T. The ejido 
variable is calculated from the earliest available ejido census within the estimation period. For 
1970-1985, the data are from the 1981 census and the 1991 census is the source for the data used 
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in estimations for the 1985-2001 period. The Xji are different in the two subperiods. A negative 
sign on the estimated coefficient β0 indicates (conditional) convergence while a positive sign 
suggests (conditional) divergence over the period. Since the error terms for state i are likely to be 
correlated during the two subperiods, we follow Chiquiar and use seemingly unrelated 
regressions to estimate the model. Results are shown in Table 2. The format of Table 2 follows 
that of Table 4 in Chiquiar to facilitate comparison. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Overall the results accord well with those in Chiquiar. With the exceptions of the estimated 
coefficients on the crime rate and illiteracy rate variables in the 1985-2001 growth rate equation, 
all are significantly different from zero at the 5% level or better and similar in magnitude to those 
reported in Chiquiar.7 All estimated coefficients have the same sign as reported by Chiquiar.  
During the 1970-1985 period the share of land in ejidos had a significant negative effect on 
per capita gdp growth rates consistent with efficiency losses associated with the communal 
system. The impact of the ejido system appears to have had an economically significant effect on 
growth. If the amount of a state’s land in ejido parcels increased by ten percentage points the 
empirical results suggest that average annual growth rate in 1970-1985 would be nearly half a 
percent lower. Conditional convergence is estimated to occur at a slightly faster rate than 
uncovered by Chiquiar. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on the ejido share variable is not significantly different from 
zero for the 1985-2001 per capita growth rate. This may be because the 1992 reforms reduced the 
inefficiency of the ejido system enough so that the system did not exert a significant drag on 
economic growth. Divergence in state growth becomes somewhat more pronounced with the 
coefficient on initial log per capita GDP increasing from .055 in Chiquiar to .067 in estimations 
for 1985-2001 with the ejido variable. 
The empirical model includes explanatory variables for agricultural output as a share of GDP 
and the fraction of the population living in rural areas and the signs and sizes of their estimated 
coefficients are similar to those reported by Chiquiar. Thus, the significant effect of the ejido 
variable does not appear attributable to the use of ejido lands for agricultural production nor their 
predominantly rural location. 
The next step is to extend Chiquiar’s data set with more recent information. We were able to 
obtain recent data on all significant explanatory variables in Chiquiar’s 1970-1985 and 1985-2001 
empirical models except for the fraction of large firms in manufacturing in each state. The base 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The crime rate coefficient reported by Chiquiar for the 1985-2001 period has a p value of 0.09. 
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year for state level gdp changed to 2003 in that year while the Chiquiar data set ends in 2001. In 
the cross section estimations using SUR there are no particular problems arising from a failure to 
have a continuous time series for gdp. Consequently rather than estimate gdp in each state for 
2002 we develop empirical models for 2003-2012 and 2005-2012 and estimate the growth 
equations for three periods: 1970-1985, 1985-2001, and 2003-2012 or 2005-2012. Aside from 
allowing an assessment of the sensitivity of results for the most recent period to different start 
dates, 2005 is the reporting year for a number of the variables in the model. We consider the 2005 
start date in order to use the most recent data available for many of the variables yet reduce the 
likelihood of feedback from state gdp growth per capita to the right hand side variables. With two 
exceptions the explanatory variables used in the 2005-2012 estimations are from 2005 and those 
used for the 2003-2012 estimations are for 2000 or 2003. The exceptions are the crime rate 
variable available only for 2010 and the ejido land area variable available for 2007.  
The 2007 ejido census shows the land area in parcels and the total ejido land area for each 
state. As with the earlier estimations we compute the fraction of state land in ejido parcels and use 
this fraction for each of the three periods in estimating the full model. Since the 1981 ejido data 
are only for parcels and estimated due to the loss of data in the earthquake, the inclusion of more 
recent data allows the estimation of a restricted model for 1985 to 2001 and 2003 (or 2005) to 
2012 using the total ejido share as the explanatory variable. 
The extended empirical model consists of an specification of equation (1) for each of three 
periods. Initially the Chiquiar model augmented with the ejido variables is left intact and a 
general to simple procedure undertaken to remove jointly insignificant explanatory variables to 
obtain a parsimonious empirical model for the 2003 to 2012 and the 2005 to 2012 specifications. 
Subsequently, the full model is also subjected to a general to specific approach to obtain a final 
specification. The same procedure is followed for the two sub-period restricted model for 1985-
2012. The ejido variables and log initial per capita GDP variables always remain in the model 
even when insignificant. Since most ejidos are in rural areas and all are dedicated to agriculture 
and related activities, the variables for rural population share and agricultural output as a percent 
of GDP also remain in the model regardless of their significance to ensure that the ejido variable 
is not capturing these differences across stats. Since our focus is on the impact of the ejido system 
and the recent convergence or divergence experience of the states, we report only the coefficients 
and t-statistics for these variables (see Tables 3 and 4). 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 
The estimation results from several different model versions are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
Model I is the Chiquiar specification with added ejido variables plus a specification for the recent 
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time period, 2003 or 2005 to 2012 that includes all additional variables. The results from this 
model are the starting point for a general to specific procedure and included for comparison. As 
can be discerned from the relatively low adjusted R2, Model I never provides a good fit for the 
third period. Model II leaves intact the Chiquiar version with ejido variables and removes jointly 
insignificant variables from the final period specification. Model III shows the final version for 
the three period estimations after applying additional Wald tests for joint significance and 
removing those variables that are insignificant from the three equation system. Due to 
uncertainties regarding the quality of the ejido data for the 1970 to 1985 period, we also 
undertake restricted SUR estimations for 1985 to 2001 and 2003 or 2005 to 2012. Restricted 
Models I to III are as described above, excluding 1970-1985, and contain the ejido parcels 
variable. Model IV is identical to Model III except that total ejido land as a fraction of the state 
surface area is substituted for the parcels measure. 
The estimation results for the full, three-period model indicate that the ejido share of state 
land had a negative effect on state economic growth in all periods, but the effect was significant 
only during the 1985-2001 period regardless of the start date for the third period. Model III is the 
specification derived from the general to specific approach applied to all three equations, hence 
best in terms of explanatory power, but the size, sign, and significance of the ejido coefficients 
vary little across the three versions. The significant negative coefficients on initial GDP per capita 
confirm previous findings of conditional convergence for 1970-1985. Unlike Chiquiar’s results, 
relatively rich states do not seem to have grown significantly faster during the 1985 to 2001 
period; there is little evidence for divergence of per capita GDP. However, there are weak 
indications of divergence for the 2003 to 2012 period with the p values of about .10 for the 
positive coefficients on initial GDP per capita. Interestingly, this finding is reversed when the 
start date for the period is 2005 as can be seen in Table 4. 
Estimating restricted Models I-III for periods 1985-2001 and 2003-2012 produce results 
similar to those for the full sample. When using the ejido parcel share of state land as the 
explanatory variable, the impact of the ejido system is significantly negative for 1985-2001 and 
negative but insignificant for 2003-2012. This result is reversed in Model IV which substitutes 
the total ejido share for the parcel share. Model IV suggests no effects of the ejido system on per 
capita GDP growth for 1985-2001 and a significant negative effect on growth in the subsequent 
period. There are no significant coefficients on initial GDP per capita in restricted Models I-III, 
thus no evidence of convergence or divergence. Since Model IV includes the same variables as 
Model III except for the measurement of the ejido share it is surprising that substitution of the 
total ejido share for the parcel share produces evidence of income divergence among the states in 
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both periods, although the positive coefficient on initial GDP per capita for 1985-2001 has a p 
value of just .094. Evidence for income divergence is stronger for 2003-2012 as indicated by the 
p value of .022 for the positive coefficient on initial GDP per capita. 
Table 4 shows estimation results in the model when the final period is 2005 to 2012. 
Conclusions regarding the effects of the ejido system on growth are the same for all periods as 
those drawn earlier. There is a significant negative effect of ejidos on growth only during 1985-
2001 when the parcel measure is used. This effect disappears for 1985-2001 in the restricted 
model when the total ejido area share is substituted and a significant negative effect is found, 
instead, for 2005-2012. Changing the start date of the third period has no effect on conclusions 
regarding the ejido effects on state growth. 
The Table 4 results indicate, as before, conditional convergence during 1970-1985. Neither 
convergence nor divergence appears in 1985-2001 except when the parcel ejido measure is 
replaced with the total measure resulting in a marginally significant positive coefficient on initial 
GDP per capita hence weak evidence of divergence for the period.  However, conclusions 
regarding conditional convergence for the 2005 to 2012 period change substantially with the 
different start date. The initial per capita GDP variable has a negative coefficient in all model 
specifications for 2005 to 2012 in both the full three period and the restricted two period versions. 
This negative coefficient, indicating conditional convergence, is significant at the 1% level for the 
most parsimonious specifications, Models II and III in the three-equation system and Models III 
and IV in the two-equation system. These different results on convergence in the third period of 
the model may be related to stagnant GDP growth in Mexico from the first quarter 2000 to the 
third quarter 2003 or they may just reflect the sensitivity of conditional convergence tests to the 
date of the initial GDP per capita variable.  
 
VI. Conclusions and Extensions 
The initial results suggest that the ejido system in Mexico reduced the growth rates of state 
per capita GDP during the 1970-1985 period. Although this initial finding is not maintained when 
the model is extended to include more recent data, the extension does suggest that the ejido 
system reduced growth during 1985 to 2001. The 1992 agrarian reforms relaxed to some extent 
the constraints on ejido land use but, apparently, restrictions were not sufficient to reduce the 
inefficiency of the system given the significant, negative impact on economic growth during the 
1985-2001 period. Since land transfers from ejido holdings to private uses remained costly and 
time-consuming, although no longer illegal, after the reforms, the absence of a negative effect of 
the ejido system in most estimations for the most recent period, whether starting in 2003 or 2005, 
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may simply indicate that the impact of the reforms in relaxing or removing growth constraints 
were not realized until the later period.  
The issue of measurement of the ejido variable may also affect the results. For the three-
equation system we were forced to use the state share of land in ejido parcels as the explanatory 
variable since the data on total land in ejidos in each state was destroyed in the Mexico City 
earthquake. Estimations restricted to the two time periods for which the total ejido land share 
variable is available suggest that the negative impact of the ejido system is significant for the 
more recent period and not significant during 1985-2001. If so, the legal reforms have done little 
to remove the inefficiencies associated with the ejido system, contrary to the conclusion 
suggested by the absence of a significant coefficient when using the ejido parcel variable to 
capture the effects of the communal property system. 
Overall, the results consistently suggest that the ejido system has restricted growth in the 
Mexican states during some time periods although the results are sensitive to the measurement of 
the ejido land share variable. These results are consistent with resource misallocation due to 
incomplete property rights of the ejidatarios but it is impossible to specify whether the 
misallocation arises because of land use restrictions, financial constraints, or the reluctance of 
ejidatarios to migrate. The maintenance of a system fraught with inefficiencies suggests a 
political rationale as outline in Albertus et al. rather than economic reasons for continuation of the 
system. 
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Table 1-Summary statistics for the fraction of state land in ejido system:1981, 1991, 2007. By 
land type* 
 
Fraction 1981 Fraction 1991 Fraction  2007 
 parcel parcel total parcel total 
Mean 0.110 0.194 0.551 0.220 0.569 
Maximum 0.244 (Veracruz) 
0.404  
(Colima) 
0.858 
(Oaxaca) 
0.459 
(Colima) 
0.919 
(Oaxaca) 
Minimum 
0.003 
(Baja 
California Sur) 
0.003  
(Baja 
California Sur) 
0.313 
(Tamaulipas) 
0.043 
(Baja 
California Sur) 
0.323  
(Nuevo Leon) 
Range 0.241 0.401 0.545 0.416 0.596 
Standard 
Deviation 0.073 0.116 0.154 0.123 0.163 
* The state having the minimum or maximum fraction is shown in parenthesis. 
Source: Derived from data available from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 
(INEGI) 
 
Table 2 Growth, ejido land area, and conditional convergence in Mexico: 1970-1985 and 1985-
2001 
 Growth 1970-1985 Growth 1985-2001 
Variable coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat 
Ejido Land as % of State -0.0443 -2.929 -0.0222 -.840 
Log initial GDP per capita -0.0092 -5.871 0.0667 2.789 
Average Schooling 0.1158 8.822 0.1077 2.844 
Schooling*Log initial GDP per 
capita 
-0.0131 -9.101 -0.0129 -3.125 
Telephones per 100 persons 0.0075 7.517 0.0031 3.529 
Federal Investment % of GDP 0.0591 3.863 -- -- 
State Expenditure Growth 0.1726 7.296 -- -- 
Agricultural Output % of GDP 0.0744 5.251 -0.1791 -5.229 
Manufacturing % of GDP -- -- -0.0748 -4.242 
% Large Firms 0.9032 6.494 0.4447 2.055 
Crime Rate -0.0003 -4.254 0.0002 1.883 
Illiteracy Rate -- -- -0.0693 -1.676 
Rural Population 0.0576 5.008 0.0917 3.000 
Log Fertility -- -- 0.0384 2.144 
Railroads/State size -- -- 0.1493 2.716 
Border Dummy*Schooling  -0.0021 -3.348 0.0025 2.340 
% with Electricity 0.0897 5.140 0.0908 2.629 
R2 0.9009  0.8151  
Adjusted R2 0.8310  0.6169  
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Table 3 Growth, ejido land area, and conditional convergence in Mexico, 1970-1985, 1985-2001, 
2003-2012 
  1970-1985 1985-2001 2003-2012 
Model Variable Coef. t statistic Coef. t statistic Coef. t statistic 
I GDP -0.0297 -2.0325 0.0234 1.0978 -0.0166 -0.4358 
I Ejido  -0.0143 -0.5893 -0.0451 -2.6678 -0.0126 -0.8607 
Adj. R2  0.5134 0.5205 -0.0571 
II GDP -0.0319 -2.2290 0.0239 1.1183 0.0124 1.6758 
II Ejido  -0.0174 -0.7217 -0.0446 -2.6401 -0.0178 -1.3197 
Adj. R2  0.5146 0.5201 0.1854 
III GDP -0.0339 -5.0623 0.0227 1.0952 0.0122 1.6528 
III Ejido  -0.0176 -0.7976 -0.0447 -3.2697 -0.0180 -1.3415 
Adj. R2  0.5574 0.5420 0.1862 
Restricted Model 
I GDP   0.0280 1.3025 -0.0165 -0.4237 
I Ejido    -0.4237 -2.6300 -0.0162 -1.0785 
Adj. R2   0.5294 -0.0395 
II GDP   0.0283 1.3166 0.0110 1.4436 
II Ejido    -0.0447 -2.6147 -0.0206 -1.4961 
Adj. R2   0.5295 0.1944 
III GDP   0.0287 1.3660 0.0110 1.4407 
III Ejido    -0.0436 -3.1580 -0.0206 -1.4982 
Adj. R2   0.5528 0.1943 
IV GDP   0.0404 1.7124 0.0139 2.3675 
IV Ejido   0.0080 0.8171 -0.0184 -2.2568 
Adj. R2   0.4190 0.2596 
GDP refers to the log initial GDP per capita variable. Ejido is the share of land in each state in 
ejido parcels in Models I, II, and III and total ejido area in Model IV. 
Source: Own calculation. 
 
Model I-Model as specified in Chiquiar augmented by the ejido variable and a 2003-2012 
specification that includes all explanatory variables and the ejido variable. 
 
Model II-Model as specified in Chiquiar augmented by the ejido variable and a 2003-2012 
specification without jointly insignificant explanatory variables and the ejido variable. 
 
Model III- Model including ejido variables without jointly insignificant explanatory variables. 
 
Model IV-Only in the restricted estimation, the parceled ejido variable is replaced with total ejido 
land area as share of state total. Otherwise the specification is the same as in Model III. 
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Table 4 Growth, ejido land area, and conditional convergence in Mexico, 1970-1985, 1985-2001, 
2003-2012 
  1970-1985 1985-2001 2003-2012 
Model Variable Coef. t statistic Coef. t statistic Coef. t statistic 
I GDP -0.0310 -2.0791 0.0222 1.0420 -0.0562 -1.3952 
I Ejido  -0.0226 0.9198 -0.0460 -2.7369 -0.0106 -0.6982 
Adj. R2  0.5241 0.5182 0.3250 
II GDP -0.0315 -2.1304 0.0230 1.0859 -0.0425 -4.8289 
II Ejido  -0.0226 -0.9225 -0.0459 -2.7323 -0.0129 -0.9254 
Adj. R2  0.5233 0.5184 0.4494 
III GDP -0.0351 -5.0637 0.0214 1.0395 -0.0425 -4.8269 
III Ejido  -0.0224 -0.9989 -0.0466 -3.4267 -0.0134 -0.9571 
Adj. R2  0.5651 0.5405 0.4498 
Restricted Model 
I GDP   0.0274 1.2782 -0.0550 -1.3566 
I Ejido    -0.0453 -2.6667 -0.0121 -0.7903 
Adj. R2   0.5276 0.3278 
II GDP   0.0277 1.2940 -0.0486 -1.5216 
II Ejido    -0.0455 -2.6752 -0.0137 -0.9200 
Adj. R2   0.5279 0.4244 
III GDP   0.0283 1.3551 -0.0429 -4.8425 
III Ejido    -0.0448 -3.2609 -0.0146 -1.0381 
Adj. R2   0.5513 0.4516 
IV GDP   0.0405 1.7234 -0.0357 -4.2269 
IV Ejido   0.0081 0.8352 -0.0176 -2.2718 
Adj. R2   0.4181 0.5094 
GDP refers to the log initial GDP per capita variable. Ejido is the share of land in each state in 
ejido parcels in Models I, II, and III and total ejido area in Model IV. 
Source: Own calculation. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A-Average annual growth rates of per capita GDP, Mexico and states 
1940-2012 and subperiods 
 1940 to 1970 1970 to 2001 1940 to 2001 2003 to 2012 
National 0.0325 0.0142 0.0232 0.0147 
State     
Aguascalientes 0.0232 0.0281 0.0257 0.0237 
Baja 
California -0.0027 0.0091 0.0033 0.0037 
Baja 
California Sur 0.0447 0.0113 0.0277 0.0180 
Campeche 0.0311 0.0347 0.0329 -0.0557 
Coahuila 0.0241 0.0167 0.0204 0.0179 
Colima 0.0188 0.0176 0.0182 0.0101 
Chiapas 0.0403 0.0095 0.0246 0.0019 
Chihuahua 0.0275 0.0243 0.0259 0.0141 
Distrito 
Federal 0.0104 0.0233 0.0170 0.0291 
Durango 0.0100 0.0200 0.0151 0.0081 
Guanajuato 0.0454 0.0130 0.0290 0.0219 
Guerrero 0.0477 0.0145 0.0308 0.0149 
Hidalgo 0.0350 0.0179 0.0263 0.0127 
Jalisco 0.0492 0.0127 0.0307 0.0157 
México 0.0595 0.0043 0.0315 0.0152 
Michoacán 0.0446 0.0168 0.0305 0.0136 
Morelos 0.0329 0.0169 0.0248 0.0132 
Nayarit 0.0376 0.0077 0.0224 0.0134 
Nuevo León 0.0320 0.0155 0.0236 0.0263 
Oaxaca 0.0505 0.0202 0.0351 0.0134 
Puebla 0.0469 0.0155 0.0309 0.0222 
Querétaro 0.0208 0.0283 0.0246 0.0327 
Quintana Roo 0.0086 0.0280 0.0185 0.0126 
San Luis 
Potosí 0.0344 0.0214 0.0278 0.0277 
Sinaloa 0.0324 0.0095 0.0208 0.0135 
Sonora 0.0343 0.0106 0.0222 0.0231 
Tabasco 0.0363 0.0084 0.0221 0.0337 
Tamaulipas 0.0198 0.0140 0.0169 0.0091 
Tlaxcala 0.0339 0.0208 0.0272 0.0045 
Veracruz 0.0292 0.0033 0.0160 0.0249 
Yucatan 0.0175 0.0179 0.0177 0.0196 
Zacatecas 0.0380 0.0173 0.0274 0.0383 
Source: Growth rates for the 1940-2001 period are calculated from data in Carrion-i-Silvestre and 
German-Soto (2007). The growth rates in the last column are calculated from INEGI data. 
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Table B-Fraction of state land in ejido system: 1981, 1991, 2007. By land type 
 
State Fraction 1981 Fraction 1991 Fraction  2007 
 Parcel Parcel Total Parcel Total 
Aguascalientes 0.1588 0.1819 0.4828 0.2327 0.4924 
Baja California 0.0511 0.0698 0.8240 0.3498 0.8308 
Baja California Sur 0.0030 0.0031 0.7272 0.0432 0.6886 
Coahuila 0.0252 0.0206 0.4678 0.1040 0.4295 
Colima 0.2125 0.4042 0.5940 0.4593 0.6043 
Chiapas 0.1687 0.3112 0.5548 0.3368 0.6059 
Chihuahua 0.0301 0.0348 0.4000 0.0499 0.4193 
Distrito Federal 0.0218 0.0916 0.3977 0.0681 0.3823 
Durango 0.0390 0.0765 0.6817 0.0669 0.6668 
Guanajuato 0.1784 0.2355 0.4318 0.2227 0.4338 
Guerrero 0.1506 0.2671 0.7179 0.3209 0.7869 
Hidalgo 0.1341 0.2463 0.5132 0.2460 0.5124 
Jalisco 0.0776 0.2236 0.4003 0.1632 0.4296 
México 0.1478 0.3080 0.5156 0.3540 0.6460 
Michoacán 0.1243 0.2506 0.4694 0.2514 0.5195 
Morelos 0.2318 0.3589 0.7838 0.4202 0.8104 
Nayarit 0.2276 0.2532 0.7909 0.2935 0.8039 
Nuevo León 0.0178 0.0378 0.3431 0.0869 0.3232 
Oaxaca 0.1118 0.2865 0.8582 0.3168 0.9192 
Puebla 0.1226 0.2067 0.4404 0.2073 0.4756 
Querétaro 0.0894 0.1497 0.5173 0.1617 0.4993 
Quintana Roo 0.0425 0.1524 0.6593 0.0601 0.6814 
San Luis Potosí 0.0925 0.1648 0.6857 0.1988 0.6878 
Sinaloa 0.1539 0.2918 0.6532 0.3128 0.7244 
Sonora 0.0206 0.0423 0.3325 0.0656 0.3535 
Tamaulipas 0.0666 0.1311 0.3126 0.1788 0.3309 
Tlaxcala 0.2150 0.3810 0.4882 0.3827 0.5064 
Veracruz 0.2441 0.3577 0.4096 0.3669 0.4193 
Yucatan 0.0444 0.1547 0.5684 0.1408 0.5836 
Zacatecas 0.0963 0.1233 0.4946 0.1527 0.5056 
Campeche 0.0491 0.1310 0.6026 0.1424 0.5508 
Tabasco 0.1399 0.3368 0.4534 0.3530 0.4478 
Source: Calculated from data developed by INEGI. 
